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a holistic, ethical, and concrete theory of the role different types
of technology ought to have in our lives, of the steps needed
to make such an assessment—a framework that presents
normative guidelines for engineers, designers, policymakers,
parents, caregivers, and others concerned with how technology
may or may not contribute to a good life. I have only recently
been able to start developing this approach, and I would be very
grateful for any criticism and constructive suggestions. At the
very least, I hope that this preliminary and cursory overview is
sufficient to convey its potential advantage and utility, and to
start a fruitful discussion on the role of prudential value and
empirical research in ethics of technology.
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Endnotes
1. Again, there is no room for a full critique in this paper, nor
is that my main purpose, but I discuss this in more detail in
Søraker 2010.
2. Although a full defence is beyond the scope of this paper, I
presuppose a variant of Fred Feldman’s “Intrinsic Attitudinal
Hedonism,” but one that is “confidence-adjusted” rather than
“truth-adjusted.” I defend this approach in Søraker 2010, and
more systematically in a forthcoming publication.
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“Friend” Is a Verb
D.E. Wittkower

Old Dominion University
People linked together by friendship, affection, or
physical love found themselves reduced to hunting for
tokens of their past communion within the compass
of a ten-word telegram. And since, in practice,
the phrases one can use in a telegram are quickly
exhausted, long lives passed side by side, or passionate
yearnings, soon declined to the exchange of such trite
formulas as: “Am well. Always thinking of you. Love.”
—The Plague, Albert Camus (1991, 69)
In the situation described in this passage, surely much of the
problem follows from the very short form of the communication
possible. Twitter exchanges seem luxurious, indulgent by
comparison. But surely much of the problem follows from the
format, regardless of length. “Mutual sympathy” is equated
here with “flesh and heart,” and surely we today agree with
Camus that there is a kind of intimacy and connection far easier
to establish in face-to-face interaction, or, more accurately,
body-to-body interaction (Fortunati 2005, 53), than in writing,
no matter whether that writing is limited to ten words. And
yet, while the centrality of co-presence and body-to-body
interaction might be of unquestionably central concern to
erotic relationships, it is far less clear that it should be crucial
to friendship. Why, exactly, does writing seem to us to be such
a poor substitute for physically co-present interaction within
the realm of friendship as well?
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The Aristotelian tradition of thought on friendship had
accustomed us to dividing friendships between those of virtue,
of pleasure, and of utility (and to disparaging the latter two). This
puts us on a path to view formal and final causes as determining
of friendship—the most prominent distinction between them
has to do with their ends, and the friendship of pleasure,
concerned so much more with a passing experience than a
lasting goal, seems cheap; a guilty pleasure. But friendships with
all sorts of formal and final causes have efficient and material
causes as well, and these cannot be ignored or discarded.
In terms of formal and final causes we might say that
friendship may be based on shared concerns, mutual support
in acting on personal and political commitments, principled
disagreement and debate, a similar sense of human, shared
interests, or common activities and pastimes. In efficient and
material aspects, the basis of friendship is found in complaining
about the soup, walking together silently, passionate debate,
laughing about something unimportant, shopping, playing cards,
drinking beer, sharing music, and being bored. Friendship is
not a static fact, but a πραξις; part of the active rather than
the contemplative aspect of living—and it must be enacted in
order to exist.
We are all familiar with the challenges of maintaining a
friendship over distances. The practice of friendship, when
placed within the context of the longhand letter, must attempt to
realize a portion of active life using tools proper to contemplative
life. As Vallor puts it,
Initially, the possibilities for sharing lives online look
relatively impoverished if we grasp the distinction
between sharing lives and sharing about lives; the
former involves performing together the activities that
make up a life, the latter involves communicating to
one another information concerning our lives, without
implying shared activity. (forthcoming, n.p.)
And not only is shared activity seemingly precluded, but the
sharing which is possible tends towards reporting only those
aspects of life which appear to us objectively meaningful,
removing access to a large portion of what life is to each of
us as it is lived, and what would have been shared in a life
lived together. “Sharing about” can capture well something of
the final cause of friendship—our common values, passions,
interests, or humor—but it is hard to see how the written form
could contain the material causes of friendship.
A life lived alongside another is disfigured when transferred
into narrative: the trivialities of life are no longer a binding
connection, but instead the subject of reportage, and the
vibrancy of life can only be made again engaging through
literary talent on the part of the letter-writer or the empathetic
imagination of the reader. As Schopenhauer said, when we
view an individual human life objectively in all its many and
varied details,
it is like a drop of water seen through a microscope,
a single drop teeming with infusoria; or a speck of
cheese full of mites invisible to the naked eye. How
we laugh as they bustle about so eagerly, and struggle
with one another in so tiny a space! And whether here,
or in the little span of human life, this terrible activity
produces a comic effect.
It is only in the microscope that our life looks so big.
It is an indivisible point, drawn out and magnified by
the powerful lenses of Time and Space. (2007, 25)
Once we live apart from a friend, and share our lives
only through the time-shifted asynchronous written word
communicated at a distance, the magnifying lenses of time and

space are no longer shared. Our own days are encountered
through a microscope, and each moment is one whose passage
we feel, no matter how unimportant its content. In speaking to
the distant friend, however, we view our life as from afar, and
we find ourselves answering simply “Not much” when asked
“What have you been up to?” as if we were limited to the space
of a telegram as in Camus’s story.
There are certainly friendships that continue and strengthen
in important aspects when this transition takes place—Briggle
(2008) provides an excellent example of pen-pals who are better
able to share meaningful and deeply personal thoughts due to
their lack of a shared location. This can be expected to occur
in proportion as the friendship has its basis within final and
formal causes rather than efficient and material causes; within
commitments and projects held in common rather than jokes,
movies, and boredom; and, most broadly, within contemplative
life rather than active life. But even the friendship based on
common values or on intellectual exchange is still a friendship
realized in moments lived and shared, and when fully abstracted
into an exchange of letters it becomes a placeholder for and
shadow of its true form.
Or, at least, this was the case until recently.
I began this section by asking why physically co-present
interaction seemed to us to be so central to friendship, and
why written interaction seemed to us to be such a poor
substitute. Although this fits the way many often think about
and talk about friendship, there are surely a great many
Facebook users who do not see the dire consequences for
friendship that theorists and commentators so frequently
bemoan, and many today, markedly but not exclusively
tweens and teens, see nothing strange about choosing
to IM or text someone who is easily available in person. I
don’t believe this is because there’s something wrong with
“these kids today,” or because we’ve lost the “true meaning
of friendship,” or because new social media have brought
our society into “the shallows.” I think it’s because we’re
wrong to think of Facebook posts, texts, tweets, and many
other forms of new social media communication as written
language; or, perhaps less paradoxically put, that writing is
increasingly an active and shared activity between distant
persons rather than an act of individually composing and
subsequently sharing meaning and information.

Changing Communications
Email has been much decried for the way in which the ease,
speed, and weightlessness of email communication has
resulted in a decline in emphasis upon spelling, grammar,
formalities, and etiquette. Moving from email to other new
media communications, we see this decline continue, as well as
seeing a positive rise in norms of casual, creative, and informal
usage, either through convenience (e.g., “ur” for “yours,” or
the foregoing of apostrophes, which the iOS virtue keyboard
puts on a separate screen) or through individual or collective
identity construction (as in the case of “l337” typographical
conventions or speech patterns stylized after LOLcats, Y U NO
guy, or innumerable other Internet memes).
We are not wrong to fear and lament the loss of habits
of thoughtful composition and proper language use, even if
there are, as I will argue, some positive aspects to this change
as well. As the speed and frequency of writing has increased,
writing as a practice has become increasingly more functional
than thoughtful, and has moved from contemplative to active
life. Heidegger even claimed that this process, which he saw
at a far earlier stage in the mere act of abbreviating of words
(1968, 34-5), threatens the very existence of meditative thought
as we use words more and more as tools rather than as bearers
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weightless, immediate, and intuitive approach to distant shared
media experiences. Furthermore, the embedded display of
linked visual media on the one hand, and the small text-entry
windows on the other, both encourage that communications
tend to become an asynchronously shared experience of
media along with a comment, rather than a written message
containing a link to some content referred to. The integration
of applications allows collaborative or competitive games
and projects to create even more concrete and interactive
asynchronous shared experiences.
This is where I disagree with Vallor’s otherwise excellent
article, “Flourishing on Facebook.” Vallor characterizes our
actions in new social media as “communicating to one another
information concerning our lives” and “providing the kinds of
informational and emotional reciprocity that maintain the will
to live together with our friends” (forthcoming, n.p.). I find
instead that the writing that takes place in new social media,
in line with the idea of resurgent orality, is better characterized
as a shared activity rather than mere information sharing.
Just as in a conversation in person, what we enjoy is not the
information but rather the back-and-forth, the playfulness of
banter, and the closeness and connection with our friend, so
too do we in new social media often find our conversations to
be more about activity than about content. As with in-person
conversations, the content itself certainly wouldn’t always
(often?) merit the time we spend on it—but that it is time
spent with friends does.
Similarly, I see no reason to describe the performance of
reciprocity as going no further than a demonstration of the will
to live together—is there not enough reason to call it a way of
actually living together asynchronously and at a distance, at
least within a limited scope of activities? If I post another picture
of baby sloths on the wall of a sloth-obsessed friend, I am not
indicating something we would do together. The sending of
sloths and lolruses is itself a practice within our friendship. If I
listen to a lo-fi Mountain Goats video posted by another friend,
I do so with the understanding that she listened to it just as I
am now, and through my experience of the song I understand
more about her experiences and aesthetic sensibility. Every
posting can be an invitation to others to encounter the posting
as if alongside ourselves, and in this way we can have a
meaningfully robust asynchronous version at a distance of many
of the everyday material causes of friendship: watching TV or
a movie, discussing the news or an article, shopping together,
playing Scrabble, and so forth. Through the limited forms of
cellphone and camera photos and videos, we can even, in a
limited and thin way, invite our network to visit our family, or
keep up to date on our vacation (or a party) as it happens. Now,
Vallor is concerned specifically with complete friendships and
friendships of virtue, so she has other reasons to dismiss these
activities as relatively trivial to her primary concern, but I think
it important nonetheless to recognize that new social media
provide us not just with a means of communication but a means
of living together, and, as Vallor well recognizes, friendships
of virtue usually come about as a deepening of relationships
initially established in the pursuit of utility or pleasure.

Old Friends, New Media
To see how new social media are relevant to the possibility of
deepening relationships towards virtue, consider the difference
between making contact with old friends via Facebook versus
via email, telephone, or letter.
In friending someone, there is a very minimal social
commitment. Users often seem to use friending as a means
of recreating former social groups, and will friend those with
whom they have no immediate desire to communicate, but just
want to check in on, touch base with, or keep in touch with. This

surely has some negative aspects—users tend to accumulate
friends who they know and care very little about—but the
lowered expectation allows people to establish connections
with those they are very much out of touch with.
The case of the old friend to whom we have little to say
exemplifies the most characteristic strengths of Facebook as a
communications platform and as a platform for asynchronous
shared activity. In this kind of relationship, contact would
be unlikely in other media, for we would not have sufficient
initial desire and purpose to motivate the investment of time
and feeling requisite to reestablish a meaningful relationship.
The low commitment of friending allows this contact to be
established, which then, through status updates and news
feeds, gives us a sense of who our old friend has become, and of
what the course of her life now consists. We may find we share
interests, commitments, and projects—either those that once
bound us together, or others that have arisen in the intervening
period. We may find we have more in common than expected,
or we may rediscover, for example, that shared sense of humor
which had always been the only thing we had in common.
And, on Facebook, a shared sense of humor and fun
is enough to re-establish a relationship—and, even more
remarkably, a relationship that can grow. Simple activities with
scalable levels of interaction, such as Facebook games, allow
us to move smoothly from playing a game because the game
is itself diverting to playing a game as a way of being together
with a friend. Competition and chatting as we play allows a
return to the quotidian moments of passing time which once
brought us together, without the artificial attempt to reestablish
a friendship using means foreign to the shared activities which
formed an initial, now lapsed bond.
In these ways, Facebook is a remarkably well-suited
platform for the activity of friendship. Where the connections
forged are superficial, they allow avenues for growth and
intensification. Where the messages and posts are terse and
simple, they allow for conversations and shared experiences
to emerge. Where the group associations and activities are
thin and basic, they allow opportunities to raise awareness
and recruit others to causes that may become passionate
commitments.
To be sure, the movement of communications technologies
from the realm of contemplative to that of active life presents
cultural problems and dangers, but it allows the long-distance
elements of friendship to become not a mere sharing of
information about activities engaged in separately, but an
active asynchronous sharing of activities themselves. This
active component of new social media communications is
both important and easily misunderstood, and as long as we
do not grasp that communications here are not reportage and
summary, but asynchronously shared experience at a distance,
much of what happens in new social media will appear to be
useless self-important triviality. We can call this the “sandwich
problem.”
Why do people talk about their sandwich? Why do people
post pictures of lunch? Surely it is not because they are under
any illusion that their sandwich is of significant objective
importance. Neither, if we are to be charitable, can we assume
that it is because the sandwich-sharer believes that he is of such
great importance to friends and associates that the slightest
and most uninteresting details of his life take on interest by
association, like Catholic relics touched by saints. What, then,
can be the motivation?
This will be ever a mystery to us as long as we believe that
the point of the communication is the information it contains.
The point is to invite friends to lunch. The sharer can then eat
alongside his absent friends, who he knows to be experiencing
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the appearance of his sandwich, as if sitting across the table. The
friends, for their part, have been granted this window into the life
of their friend, which they may either ignore entirely, or choose
to reflect upon and, in so doing, revitalize their connection. If this
kind of asynchronous, opt-in broadcast, mediated togethernessat-a-distance displaced more robust forms of shared activity,
this would certainly be a worry—but the point is that we can’t
even make sense of why people do this unless we accept that
this is experienced as a shared activity of communion, rather
than a communication of information.
“Friend” is a verb, now, thanks to Facebook—and it is well
that this is so. While “friending” is the mere establishment of
a connection on this social networking site, what is both most
important and most surprising about Facebook is its affordances
for friendship as an activity.
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Embodied Cognition and the Turing Test:
An Uncomfortable (Re-)Union
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Abstract
For decades, the artificial intelligence community has questioned
the validity and strength of the Turing Test as a way to evaluate
the presence or absence of a mind. Given the recent surge of
evidence for embodiment theories, the Turing Test has been
considered largely irrelevant. However, conceptual metaphor
theory, a strong theory of embodiment, ironically offers a way
to save the Turing Test. In spite of the fact that the theory, as
articulated by Lakoff and Johnson (1987, 1999) is explicit in its
rejection of AI, it offers a strong linguistic basis for evaluating
the presence of an underlying mind.

genuine intelligence, and setting the bar for AI theorists
indefinitely. And while Turing almost certainly never intended
for his Imitation Game (what has come to be known as the
Turing Test) to be an operational definition (that only and exactly
those things that pass it count as intelligent), the test took on a
life of its own over the sixty-plus years since Turing proposed
it. In fact, I know of almost no one in the field of AI theory who
defends the test as written (excepting maybe Daniel Dennett,
whose defense will be discussed below), and yet it remains the
benchmark that everyone almost-embarrassingly references,
seemingly dismissing it as overly simplistic while using the
same breath to grudgingly admit that no machine or program
has yet passed it. It is this apparent contradiction that I intend
to discuss here, while offering evidence and argument that the
Turing Test is overdue to be re-examined as a potentially valid
test for artificial intelligence.
Despite the Turing Test being generally the most talkedabout and well-known test for AI, most discussion in the
literature has remained critical. Particularly in light of what I will
call the Embodied Revolution in the fields of AI and cognitive
science, the Turing Test has been pushed even further from
prominence in recent years. As more and more researchers
embrace the claims of embodiment theories, a purely linguistic
test begins to look less and less viable as a candidate for a true
test of intelligence. By “intelligence,” I include the concept of
mind or consciousness that is the true goal of AI. (It isn’t clear to
me what intelligence looks like in the absence of a mind, since
arguably we have many machines that are already intelligent in
that sense and yet we do not believe we have achieved true AI.
Searle’s (1980) distinction here between Strong and Weak AI is
relevant, and I’m interested only in the notion of Strong AI here.)
In what follows, I will give the reader a brief background of AI’s
history, including the role played by the Turing Test, spending
some time on the Embodied Revolution and what it has meant
to the field. Then, I will argue that Lakoff and Johnson’s work
on Conceptual Metaphor specifically (and ironically) offers
us a reason to re-think this move away from the Turing Test.
Ultimately, it seems as though one can reject many of the
assumptions of what Haugeland (1986) called “GOFAI” (Good
Old-Fashioned AI), including that human thought is primarily
symbol manipulation, and still accept that the Turing Test is a
valid test of human-like intelligence.
Historically, AI has gone through a number of research
paradigms. Different philosophers have carved this history up
differently, but one can see fairly clearly that there have been at
least three major approaches to the field, all of which overlap
one another chronologically at some point, and all of which
remain active research projects today. We often use the term
“GOFAI” to describe the earliest work in AI, that which is based
on the Physical Symbol System Hypothesis of Newell and Simon
(1976). In their words:
A physical symbol system has the necessary and
sufficient means for general intelligent action. By
“necessary” we mean that any system that exhibits
general intelligence will prove upon analysis to be
a physical symbol system. By “sufficient” we mean
that any physical symbol system of sufficient size can
be organized further to exhibit general intelligence.
By “general intelligent action” we wish to indicate
the same scope of intelligence as we see in human
action. (116)
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It is almost impossible to over-estimate the impact that Alan
Turing’s 1950 paper Computing Machinery and Intelligence
has had on the artificial intelligence (AI) community. Turing’s
historic paper set the stage for a sort of “put up or shut up”
moment in the field, challenging those who spend their time
working out what it might mean for a machine to exhibit

It’s not difficult to see how the Physical Symbol System
Hypothesis approaches the problem of intelligence in AI
much the same way Turing did, in so far as the focus remains
firmly on the symbolic representation of information. Although
Turing wanted to limit the test to only digital computers, the
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